By Tandawu Gedzatidye:
When discussions about cases of delayed justice arise in Malawi, the Judiciary is often quick to adopt a defensive stance.
For example, when the public expressed astonishment that the Finance Bank of Malawi licence issue took over 20 years to be concluded at the pinnacle of the Malawian judicial system, the Chief Registrar highlighted legal applications along the way as the major cause of the delay.
Other justifications for delays in delivering judgements on cases brought before the courts for arbitration have centred on personnel issues. The Judiciary has consistently pushed for the recruitment of more judges, although the available ones have rarely demonstrated sufficient efficiency.
Anyone assuming that the Finance Bank of Malawi vs. Reserve Bank of Malawi matter is the only outstanding case of delayed justice would be mistaken.
Although the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial within a reasonable time is a defining characteristic of the rule of law, there exists a litany of cases demonstrating that Malawian courts are, in practice, undermining this principle.
Available literature highlights a particularly striking example often cited when discussing delayed judgements in Malawi: the civil case of Muhammad Kulesi vs. Royal Insurance Company Limited. Filed in 1993, the matter was reportedly resolved after 27 years.
For perspective, 27 years is the same period that liberation icon and South Africa’s first black president, Nelson Mandela, spent in prison. The comparison underscores the magnitude of delay that can occur in judicial processes.
Similarly, the dispute between Cane Products Limited and Press Corporation Limited, filed in 2003, experienced prolonged delays in judgment delivery.
Another notable example widely regarded as a classic case of delayed judgement is Mahata v. Malawi Housing Corporation. Initiated in 2005, the matter took several years to conclude.
These delays are not confined to civil matters alone. Criminal cases are also affected, particularly where accused persons remain on remand in prison, as is common in murder trials.
One may imagine an individual spending 27 years in prison only to be pronounced innocent, simply because a responsible authority took an excessively long time to determine the matter. Questions would naturally arise regarding compensation for lost time and suffering.
Such delays demonstrate how those seeking justice may inadvertently subject themselves to mental anguish and emotional distress.
Given the prolonged periods individuals wait for judgements, many may not live to enjoy the relief they fought for. Twenty-seven years is an excessively too long a time for someone to remain alive and in good health.
Consider a person challenging unfair dismissal at the Industrial Relations Court (IRC) and waits 27 years for justice. Does such delay support their quest for justice and economic welfare? Would they enjoy compensation if granted? Might they have died before resolution?
The primary cause of these delays is not necessarily the substantive matters raised during hearings as suggested by the Chief Registrar. Even cases without interruptions experience delayed determinations.
Some hearings conclude within an hour, yet the presiding magistrate or judge takes an extended period to deliver judgement. In such instances, parties cannot be blamed for the delay.
Much of the delay rests with those presiding over cases. This conduct leads to cases piling up, resulting in backlog—a term frequently cited by the Judiciary, often accompanied by claims of understaffing.
Allowing cases to backlog is largely attributable to those presiding over matters rather than staff shortages. The tendency to sit on cases for prolonged periods contributes significantly to backlog and undermines access to justice.
At one point reports indicated that the IRC had stopped handling new cases in order to clear backlog, including matters pending for over 10 years.
However, media reports also suggested that the court concluded cases filed during the period when new cases were allegedly suspended.
Therefore, delayed issuance of judgements should not solely be attributable to substantive matters raised during hearings nor to staff shortages. Rather, it is a reflection of inefficiency among available personnel.
Judges and magistrates must demonstrate the ability to deliver judgements within a reasonable timeframe. Cases whose hearings have concluded should not take months before judgement is delivered.
Judicial officers should assert authority and ensure that parties do not dictate proceedings beyond legitimate case arguments. They must decisively address lawyers who deliberately cause postponements through unnecessary applications or adjournments.
Above all, the Judiciary should set standards by adopting strict key performance indicators for case handlers. A minimum number of cases should be concluded monthly by each judge or magistrate.
The Judiciary should avoid situations where a judge or magistrate becomes effectively forgotten within the system. Clear timelines should exist between case initiation and conclusion.
The Chief Registrar must be policing his staff on these issues instead of trumpeting scapegoats for inefficiencies in judgement delivery. How can someone at the IRC conclude hearing of a matter and then go years without the parties hearing the determination?
Claims of understaffing should only arise after demonstrating efficiency among available judicial staff. Substantive matters should never serve as excuses as judges and magistrates can establish housekeeping rules for case management.
